

CONFERENCE OF THE TEN NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 22 May 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Sir Paul MASON

(United Kingdom)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. M. KARASSIMONOV

Mr. V. IZTIRLIEV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. S. F. RAE

Mr. J. F. M. BELL

Mr. R. M. TAIT

Mr. P. D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. L. SIMOVIC

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. F. DOBIAS

Mr. Z. SEINER

Ethiopia:

Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A. S. LALL

Mr. A. S. MEHTA

Mr. S. B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L. C. N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. H. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. S. SERBANESCU
Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL
Baron C. H. von PLATEN
Mr. G. ZETTERQVIST

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. O. A. GRINEVSKY
Mr. V. A. SEMENOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. S. AHMED
Mr. M. KASSEM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J. G. TAHOURDIN

Mr. J. H. EDES

Mr. R. C. BEEHAM

United States of America:

Mr. C. C. STELLE

Mr. A. L. RICHARDS

Mr. D. E. MARK

Mr. R. A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I declare open the one hundred and thirty-fifth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): In the speeches we deliver here we often say that the negotiations on general and complete disarmament are difficult and of high responsibility, and that therefore they must be carried on patiently, giving every problem a deep, many-sided and undoubtedly time-taking analysis. The Romanian delegation too has expressed such views, which it continues to consider valid. Any person who senses the responsibility weighing upon the shoulders of this Committee cannot but associate himself with this assessment. But in nature, in life, every phenomenon has its own contradictory aspects. While we are in favour of profound, many-sided and exhaustive discussions on the essential problems of general and complete disarmament, we cannot help noting that going beyond certain limits produces an effect which is contrary to the desired one.

The debates on disarmament measures with regard to the delivery of nuclear weapons have been going on in this Committee for quite a long time. Nobody denies that the issue is one of the cornerstones of the treaty as a whole, that it is the point where the essential problems of the treaty are thrashed out. Nobody denies that we have to devote prolonged efforts to that problem; but should we go beyond the limit I have just mentioned, should we fail to turn the quantity of our negotiations into the quality of result, then our labours would prove to be lacking in quality, and the result would be the opposite pole from what we are pursuing.

This Committee is not an academic body which has set itself to discuss, for example, the sex of the angels or the resurrection of the soul. The United Nations General Assembly has entrusted us with the task of preparing the treaty on general and complete disarmament. What does this mean? In our view, it means to discuss the problems posed by general and complete disarmament and to negotiate. I say: to discuss and to negotiate. To discuss means to make the problems clear, to acquire knowledge of all their elements, to see all their meanings and implications. To negotiate means to act from a political standpoint in order to bring the respective positions closer together, to harmonize the results of the discussions in order to secure a common political and legal instrument -- the treaty -- on the basis of which the signatory States should act for the implementation of general and complete disarmament.

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Having in mind those motives, allow me to refer to this Committee's work devoted in the last few months to general and complete disarmament. In the view of the Romanian delegation there are two most characteristic features of that activity, and from them we must draw the necessary conclusions if we wish our negotiations to yield fruit from now on. The first characteristic feature refers to the approach to the essence of the matter; the second refers to the methods employed by one side and by the other.

With regard to the essence of the problem, the position of the socialist countries is well known. From the first stage of the process of general and complete disarmament radical steps have to be taken conducive to the elimination of the danger of nuclear war. Hence the initial Soviet proposal, embodied in the draft Soviet treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control (ENDC/2), to proceed to the liquidation of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles without any exception from the very first stage. That is fully consonant with the absolute necessity of removing from the very beginning of the disarmament process the danger of a devastating nuclear war.

The stand of the Western Powers is utterly different. In the system proposed by the Western Powers there is no thought of putting an end to the nightmare of nuclear war in either the first, the second or the third stage. The embodiment of that stand is the proposal, contained in the United States outline of basic provisions (ENDC/30) and supported by the other Western States, to reduce in the first stage nuclear weapon delivery vehicles to the extent of 30 per cent.

The essential defect of that proposal is that it does not meet the paramount requirement of the present historical moment -- that of curbing as soon as possible the danger of a devastating nuclear war. Convincing arguments have been adduced to this effect, and that is why I think it is hardly necessary now to go into details again. It is known that no understanding could be reached on the basis of those initial proposals. A way out of the situation appeared to be extremely difficult.

Then came the new initiative of the Soviet Government. I have in mind the Gromyko proposal (A/PV.1127, provisional, p.38-40). The content of that proposal is well known. It provides for an exception from the principle of destroying all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage by the retention by the United States and the Soviet Union of a mutually-agreed, strictly-limited number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, anti-missile missiles and ground-to-air anti-aircraft missiles, which would be retained by

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the two major nuclear Powers, exclusively on their territories, up to the end of the second stage. The substance and the merit of the Gromyko proposal in its essence lie in the fact that its practical implementation would bring about the solution of the fundamental issue which concerns us here: the elimination of the nuclear danger from the very first stage of the disarmament process. The Gromyko proposal emerged from the debates in this Committee on the respective problems, their clarification, and the analysis of their meaning and implications.

Then followed the stage of negotiation -- that is, of seeking a compromise solution. In view of the -- in our opinion unjustified -- opposition of the United States and the other Western Powers to the initial Soviet proposal to destroy all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles without any exception, and in view of the desire of those Powers to retain during a certain period what their representatives call a "nuclear umbrella", the Soviet Government made a step forward to meet the other side's stand. That is a specific proof of suppleness and flexibility, of combining the need to counter the nuclear danger facing mankind today with the desire to meet the viewpoint of the other side. The adoption of the Gromyko proposal, which was inspired by the spirit of negotiation, would have given a powerful impetus to our work here; it would have moved forward our negotiations on general and complete disarmament. We must regretfully note that that did not happen, owing to the opposition of the Western Powers.

What has been the attitude of the Western delegations during the eight months since the new Soviet proposal was put forward? What has been the method used by the representatives of the Western Powers in connexion with that proposal? The debate on the proposal, both at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and in this Chamber, in 1962 as well as during this year, has revealed three characteristic features of the position taken by the delegations of the Western Powers:

First, greeting the Gromyko proposal as representing a step towards getting out of a situation which apparently had no prospects;

Second, asking questions motivated by the "necessity" to understand that proposal; and

Finally, rejecting the Gromyko proposal in essence as well as rejecting in general the idea of the practical elimination of the nuclear danger in the very first stage of the process of general and complete disarmament.

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We all remember how, immediately after the new Soviet proposal was made known, it was greeted not only by wide circles of the United Nations General Assembly but also by the Western Powers represented at this Conference. In this connexion a few examples will suffice.

On 25 September 1962 Mr. Green, former Foreign Minister of Canada and head of the Canadian delegation to the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, stated:

"Canada welcomes the announced intention of the Soviet Union to modify its proposals for eliminating nuclear weapons vehicles. In our view, this may help to remove the block to negotiations in Geneva which was created by the incompatible positions of the two sides on this particular question". (A/PV.1130, provisional, p.32)

Mr. Dean, then the leader of the United States delegation, on 12 December 1962, in this very Chamber, characterized the proposal as "very interesting" (ENDC/PV.91, p.12)

In his turn, the leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Mr. Godber, declared:

"... I was very happy when the Soviet Union Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, at the General Assembly in New York, made the proposal to carry on certain nuclear delivery vehicles from the first stage to the second. It seemed to me that that was a move in the right direction". (ENDC/PV.92, p.26)

That came after another member of the United Kingdom delegation, Sir Michael Wright, had said a few days before:

"... I for one am prepared to regard the new Soviet proposal as a potential means of working towards bridging the gap between the former Soviet position and the position which the West has adopted at this Conference." (ENDC/PV.90, p.43)

Those were statements which at first sight could engender a certain optimism. But in the statements of the Western representatives there appeared a significant "but" and a sequence of even more significant questions. It would mean extending my statement today unduly if I were to take up again each and every one of the questions that have been asked, each and every one of the alleged clarifications that have been requested. The questions have been answered.

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I should like to be well understood: we are not against clarifications or the technique of asking questions. When this method of work is resorted to from a sincere desire to move forward our labours here, when it is the progress of negotiations that is being pursued, when the achievement of the agreement is envisaged, such a method cannot be ruled out but, on the contrary, may be welcomed.

Here a natural question arises. Did the tactics resorted to by the Western delegations stem from a desire to make our negotiations progress, did it tend to pave the way for the conclusion of an agreement? The answer to this question must be looked for in the very statements made by the representatives of the Western Powers. We suggest that in order to avoid any element of a subjective nature, in order to secure an objective presentation of the situation, and in order to have the facts of life speak for themselves.

Two examples seem to confirm that the tactics of questions and clarifications, as used by the Western delegations, were dictated not by a desire to seek a common ground for understanding but by the opposition of those delegations to the very substance of the Soviet initiative. The representatives of the Western Powers spoke rather a lot about the so-called unsatisfactory character of the control arrangements proposed by the Soviet Union with a view to implementation of the Gromyko proposal. Numerous questions -- open and less open, meaningful and less meaningful -- were asked, and this aspect of the matter consumed a fairly important part of our debates.

It is possible that those questions might have produced confusion, might have puzzled certain minds; but now the mists are scattered. On 15 May 1963 the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, made a statement in order to clear up the genuine position of the West with regard to the very substance of the Gromyko proposal. On that occasion Mr. Burns said:

"... NATO, as a defensive alliance, would be broken up completely under the terms of the Soviet first stage measures. That would be so even if those measures were implemented with verification considered adequate by the West, ..." (ENDC/PV.132, p.22)

One cannot say that that statement is devoid of any merit. On the contrary, its merit consists in that it reveals in no equivocal manner that the Western Powers have made use of questions regarding control as a screen to cover up their real stand on the substance of the Gromyko proposal. What could appear to certain representatives as a field in

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which some clarifications were still wanted has been made abundantly clear after such statements as the one made by the Canadian representative, which I have just quoted.

But let us pass to another aspect. For four months running, the Western delegations have been trying to pretend that there is no clarity in the Gromyko proposal regarding the number of missiles, the types of those missiles, and so on, and that for that reason they cannot possibly adopt a clear-cut position on its substance. Here confusion and misapprehension could also occur, but here too the mists have been scattered.

On 24 April 1963 Mr. Stelle threw some light on the Western Powers' stand concerning that aspect of the matter. He said:

"All in all, the Soviet stage I proposal, even with the Gromyko modification, provides for a vast and wholly impractical overloading of stage I, and that at a time when peace-keeping measures would not have been at all expanded to cope with the new international situation." (ENDC/PV.124, p.35)

Of course I object to the substance of the conclusion drawn by the Western Powers; but what we are interested in here is the fact that, in order to reach such a conclusion, the United States delegation did not need to ask any questions or to seek any clarifications, and above all did not need such a long period during which our negotiations have virtually been marking time.

Now here is another aspect of the issue. For months on end the Western delegations, while discussing the Gromyko proposal, have asked questions regarding the balance of forces. Here also confusion and misapprehension could occur, but here too the mists have been scattered. At the same meeting of 24 April 1963 the representative of the United States said:

"On the basis of those considerations with regard to Foreign Minister Gromyko's proposal we believe that that proposal as now formulated, taken alone as well as in the context of other measures proposed in stage I of the Soviet draft treaty, would, if implemented, create grave imbalances in favour of the Soviet Union and to the disadvantage of the West." (ibid, p.36)

Here too I object to the substance of the conclusion arrived at by the United States delegation. It is clear that a proposal which provides that the number of missiles to be retained should be established by mutual agreement cannot lead to any imbalance to the

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detriment of the Western side. If I have referred to this excerpt from Mr. Stelle's statement it is, again, in order to demonstrate that there is nothing in the negative stand of the Western Powers on the Gromyko proposal of a nature to require supplementary clarification of the kind asked from the Soviet Union for eight months on end, and pictured as indispensable to the Western Powers in order to enable them to adopt a definite stand.

History does not repeat itself in its essential moments, and that is why it is not always advisable to make historical analogies. But this time an analogy springs to one's mind. In order not to involve our Committee in too many reminiscences I shall presume to draw my colleagues' attention to just one example. It was on 10 May 1955. The day before had marked just ten years since the end of the Second World War, the most terrible mankind had ever known. The Soviet Government then submitted disarmament proposals which took into account to a large extent the proposals and viewpoints previously expressed by the Western Powers. The reaction of the delegations of the Western Powers at that time is very instructive from the point of view of understanding even better the character and the nature of the tactics now employed by the Western delegations in connexion with the Gromyko proposal.

The representative of France, Mr. Moch, immediately declared that "the whole thing looks too good to be true".

On 12 May, after forty-eight hours of consultation with his Government, the representative of the United States of America declared on behalf of his country:

"We have been gratified to find that the concepts which we have put forward over a considerable length of time, and which we have repeated many times during this past two months, have been accepted in a large measure by the Soviet Union."

On the same date the representative of the United Kingdom expressed his delight at the fact that what he called "the Western policy of patience" had --

"... now achieved this welcome dividend, and that the proposals [of the West] have now been largely, and in some cases entirely, adopted by the Soviet Union and made into its own proposals."

Further, the United Kingdom representative listed seven major points on which there was agreement, and summarized the situation in the following words:

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"We have made an advance that I never dreamed possible on Monday last."

A recess in the negotiations followed, and that at the request of the Western delegations. The Disarmament Sub-Committee reconvened after three and a half months on 29 August 1955. On 6 September the representative of the United States Government declared:

"The United States does now place a reservation upon all of its pre-Geneva substantive positions taken in this Sub-Committee, or in the Disarmament Commission, or in the United Nations on these questions in relationship to levels of armament."

These quotations are to be found in the work by Philip Noel-Baker entitled The Arms Race (1958, pp. 21-23).

It results from this, therefore, that in the past as well as nowadays it is enough that the Soviet Union, from a desire to facilitate the achievement of agreement, should meet the position of the other side for that side immediately to resort either to repudiating its own previous stand or to rejecting the proposals which take into account its own point of view.

And so we can now outline two techniques in our negotiations: the socialist one, consisting in a search for solutions to the difficulties; and the Western one, consisting in a search for difficulties for the solutions. It is only too obvious that one who wishes for the success of our negotiations must keep to the first of the two techniques.

How are we to explain that the Western Powers in general and the United States of America in particular are rejecting proposals meant to put an end -- and that as quickly as possible -- to the nuclear danger and to banish from the world for ever all nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles? I cannot dissociate from the list of causes the concern evinced by certain influential media in the United States in looking for the means to win a nuclear war against the socialist countries and to persuade the Government and the people of the United States that, should such a war take place, the United States of America would win it.

In this connexion it will suffice to refer to the news item published in the United Kingdom newspaper The Times on 29 April 1963, in which the following is reported from Washington:

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"The Defence Department has just completed a war game on computers, which, according to reports, confirms the belief that the United States would prevail in total nuclear war. ...

"The war game, known as Simulation of Total Atomic Global Exchange (Stage), is said to have taken nearly three years to prepare and five months to play."

I am convinced that such a news item did not merely emerge from the imagination of the correspondent of The Times. It is a sad reality. A ministry of such standing in the United States Administration as the Defense Department had been preparing a war game for three years and playing it for five months, reaching the conclusion that the United States would win a total nuclear war. The correspondent of The Times comments on the news in the following words:

"The conclusion is comforting although not unexpected, but this reliance on computers instead of human experience, and the extent of nuclear destruction which the civilized mind is prepared to contemplate, fills many people here with despair."

Naturally, the Romanian delegation's stand differs on many points from that of the correspondent of The Times. For instance, we doubt both the prerequisites and the conclusions of the "war game" in which the United States Department in question has been indulging. But the essential difference between our stands is that the Romanian delegation is far from any feeling of despair. We in the socialist countries do not despair, in spite of the interests and the plans of those who play at war and hope for a war to break out. We fight for the triumph of reason; we fight in order that the will for peace of the peoples and the sense of responsibility of the governments may emerge triumphant. Recently, in a speech made on the occasion of the visit to Romania of U Thant, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the President of the State Council of the Romanian People's Republic, Gheorghiu-Dej, said:

"The supreme duty of all governments conscious of their responsibility for the destiny of their own peoples is to militate for the settlement of the major international issues in a peaceful way, is to act for the implementation of general and complete disarmament."

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Our debate on points 5(b) and 5(c) concerning disarmament measures to be taken in stage I (ENDC/1/Add.3, p.2) is nearing its end. Soon we are going to pass on to other items, leaving to our co-Chairmen the task of drawing up a common text, which unfortunately will constitute a balance sheet, not of the progress achieved, but of the divergencies which have become clear and which still persist. But our leaving aside for the time being the discussion in the plenary sitting of our Conference of points 5(b) and 5(c), and more particularly of the Gromyko proposal, does not mean that those issues cannot be solved; nor does it alter the fact that they must be solved. They are still the subject of our attention, and while we are getting ready to discuss disarmament measures with regard to the nuclear weapons themselves, let us not lose sight of the substance of these problems or of the causes which have prevented us from solving them. Agreement cannot be reached as long as only one side makes concessions. Both sides must give proof -- by deeds and not by mere words -- of flexibility, patience and realism in their desire to reach agreement.

We are confronted with a very real task which can and must be fulfilled: general and complete disarmament. In order to fulfil it we must all give proof of lucid understanding of the fact that the alternative to disarmament -- a nuclear world war -- would be the greatest catastrophe. Would anyone choose that alternative?

The Romanian delegation, in accordance with its Government's instructions, will devote all its efforts to the fulfilment of the task of contributing to ensure the peaceful co-existence of States by the implementation of general and complete disarmament.

Mr. SIKOVIC (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): The Czechoslovak delegation has already had the opportunity of speaking at several previous meetings of this Committee on the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and the liquidation of military bases on foreign territory. Since during recent weeks the delegations of the Western Powers in opposing adoption of the Soviet proposal, have tried to raise questions that are not matters of principle and to use various arguments aimed at preventing agreement, the Czechoslovak delegation deems it necessary to revert to this question at our next meeting.

In accordance with instructions I have received, I should like to acquaint the Committee with the statement of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic of 17 May 1963 regarding the creation of a combined NATO nuclear force. The content of this

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statement is closely related to the problems before our Committee, and points out the true causes of the present difficulties we are encountering in our efforts to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament, as well as on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests and the implementation of collateral measures. The text of the statement is as follows:

"For a long time world public opinion has been anxiously following the present efforts of the Governments of the States members of NATO, and of the United States in the first place, to transform this aggressive bloc into a new nuclear force. This question will be dealt with at the meeting of the NATO Council, which opens on 21 May 1963 at Ottawa and at which it is intended to take concrete measures for the implementation of plans concerning the aggressive nature of which there can be no doubt. The Government of Czechoslovakia deems it necessary to express its point of view in regard to this NATO policy, which is aggravating international tension and increasing the danger of a nuclear war.

"At the present time, the most urgent task of all governments is to make every possible effort to reduce international tension and to restore and strengthen confidence between States and, in particular, to bring about general and complete disarmament.

"The policy of the NATO countries is in fundamental contradiction with these requirements. This is shown, among other things, by the dangerous actions of the Governments of the States members of this group, aimed at accelerating the armaments race and at further accumulating stockpiles of nuclear weapons, as well as strategic means of delivering them. An integral part of this policy, which is inimical to the cause of peace, are plans for the creation of a unified NATO nuclear force, the implementation of which would lead to spreading the possession and control of nuclear weapons to other States. As a result of this, the danger of a thermonuclear war will be still further increased and any local conflict might develop into one. This policy is directed against the interests of world peace and security and thereby also against the vital interests of the countries whose governments are taking part in its implementation. But a special danger to peace derives from the fact that the implementation of these plans would enable the West German militarists to participate in decisions regarding the use of nuclear weapons and even further subordinate the strategy of NATO to the achievement

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of the aggressive aims of West German imperialism. It is no secret to anyone that these plans of the West German revanchists are aimed in the first place against the socialist countries. But it is not so well remembered that hitherto every aspiration of the German militarists towards world domination began with an attack on the West. This is what happened during the First World War in the case of neutral Belgium and France of the Entente and in the Second World War Great Britain, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark and Norway were added to the list.

"The expansionism of West German militarism does not exclude the possibility that these countries, even though they are at present allies of the Federal Republic of Germany, will not again be its victims in the future. In fact, the Federal Republic of Germany, within the framework of NATO, already possesses in Europe the strongest military contingents among all the other Member States. Furthermore, it is constantly increasing its influence by adding to the number of West German officers in NATO staff services and is taking every step to secure for itself the key positions in the governing bodies of NATO.

"At present a subject of particular interest to the Federal Republic of Germany is the acquisition of nuclear weapons so as to strengthen its military power. It is counting on successfully achieving this aim within the framework of the NATO multilateral nuclear force. The most recent evidence of this is to be found in the Budget debate in the Bundestag, when authoritative persons said that participation in any kind of multilateral nuclear force should enable the Federal Republic of Germany to participate in joint nuclear decisions. This also explains the readiness of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to bear a considerable part of the expenditure, 35 to 40 per cent, involved in the creation of a NATO multilateral force.

"The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is the principal and most determined opponent of all measures and proposals put forward by the socialist countries for reducing international tension and strengthening the peaceful co-existence of the European States. The Western Powers, which are now deliberately facilitating the transfer of nuclear weapons into the hands of the West Germany Bundeswehr, must realize the danger that they may be drawn, perhaps even against their will, into a fatal nuclear war as a result of the adventurist, revanchist and

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expansionist activities of West Germany militarist circles. The reality of this danger is also clear to the Government circles of certain NATO members, which are taking an attitude of reserve towards these plans. The Czechoslovak Government fully understands this attitude of reserve.

"The plans of the Western Powers for the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force is in obvious contradiction with their repeated assertions that they agree to the implementation of general and complete disarmament and to the adoption of measures which would prevent both the further development of nuclear weapons and their proliferation in the world.

"The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, as a member of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, in which, together with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, it is making the utmost effort to achieve the speediest possible conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament and the immediate and final cessation of nuclear tests in all environments, as well as the implementation of other measures, has been following these developments with great concern. The Government and people of Czechoslovakia have supported, and will always continue to support, actively all efforts aimed at such a settlement of international relations as would open the way to consolidating world peace and international security and eliminating the threat of a nuclear war. The Government of Czechoslovakia regards the consistent application and observance of the principle of peaceful co-existence in relations between States as the only real possibility for achieving this aim. An integral part of this policy is the systematic effort to achieve the implementation of general and complete disarmament under strict international control, as well as the elimination of the vestiges of the Second World War by means of an agreement between the parties, the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and on that basis the normalization of the situation in West Berlin. But what is to be done in the meantime, before the problem of disarmament is solved?

"Instead of building up nuclear armaments and attempting to create new nuclear forces, we should, in view of the present tense situation, strive to secure the implementation of measures which would reduce the danger of a nuclear war, promote the creation of an atmosphere of confidence between States and create favourable conditions for the implementation of a programme of general and complete disarmament.

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Among such measures are proposals which would prevent the use of foreign territories for the stationing of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons and proposals for the elimination of all foreign military bases and the withdrawal of armed forces from the territory of foreign States. An important contribution towards improving the situation, not only in Europe but throughout the world, would undoubtedly be the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the Warsaw Treaty States, as well as the creation of denuclearized zones throughout the world, in the first place in Central Europe.

"All these problems are on our agenda and they must be settled gradually by way of negotiation. Therefore the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic calls upon the Governments of the States members of NATO to renounce the dangerous course of feverish arming with nuclear missiles and, instead, to apply their efforts to the adoption of effective measures which would definitively eliminate the threat of a nuclear war. The Czechoslovak Government again solemnly declares that in its foreign policy it will continue to support and strive for the implementation of all proposals aimed at achieving general and complete disarmament and ensuring permanent peace and peaceful co-operation.

"If the policy of the Western nuclear Powers, despite the protests of all peace-loving peoples, leads to the spread of nuclear weapons to other capitalist States, in particular to the Federal Republic of Germany, the Czechoslovak Government deems it necessary to state with the utmost conviction that, together with its allies, it will take all necessary measures to ensure the security of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the inviolability of its borders."

That is the end of the statement. I request the representative of the Secretariat to arrange for the text of the statement of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to be circulated as a document of the Committee^{1/}.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): Unfortunately, it seems to have become a habit of the Soviet Union and its allies to greet every major reconvening of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with propaganda statements, notes and proposals. The statement of the Government of Czechoslovakia which has been read into our records today by the representative of Czechoslovakia, including as it does unwarranted attacks upon

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the policies of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, is one such statement. There are other statements and proposals, about which we shall undoubtedly hear in due course from our Soviet colleague.

Those statements will not, of course, distract the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from proceeding, in keeping with its character of a defensive alliance, with the necessary perfection of collective defence among its members; nor do we believe that they should distract us from our serious work in this Conference. My delegation does not propose to let them distract it from that work.

In accordance with the recommendation of the two co-Chairmen, adopted by the Committee on 17 May (ENDC/FV.133, p.36), discussion of items 5(b) and 5(c) of our agreed agenda (ENDC/1/Add.3) is supposed to be continued today, and perhaps during part of our meeting next Wednesday.

Our Soviet colleague made a statement on 15 May (ENDC/FV.132, pp. 5 et seq.) on the Soviet proposal for the retention of an agreed, strictly limited number of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles until the end of stage II (ENDC/2/Rev.1, Arts. 5-8). Although that statement did not seem to us to contain any information of a type which could clarify for us the true substance of the proposal, the Soviet representative did make some points upon which I should like to comment.

First, the Soviet representative reiterated his claim that the Western delegations now had sufficient clarification of the Soviet proposal to enable them to express their attitude towards that proposal at least in principle. He asserted also that whatever questions the West had asked about the proposal were contrived and designed to cover up, as he put it, the Western unwillingness to negotiate seriously. We had certain echoes of that from our Romanian colleague this morning. My delegation believes that it is precisely those who refuse to explain their own proposals, and thus deprive our Committee of the possibility of engaging in constructive and serious discussion of those proposals, who are themselves holding up meaningful negotiations; and we believe that this view has been expressed by a number of delegations here.

At that meeting of 15 May the Soviet representative said that "the nature of the reply" -- and he of course meant the Western reply to the Gromyko proposal --

"will have a considerable influence on the work of our Committee, because it will show whether the United States is prepared, together with other peace-loving

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

States, to seek a way to a mutually-acceptable solution of disarmament questions or whether it will avoid reaching agreement as before."

(ENDC/PV.132, p. 6)

We submit that the Soviet representative's statements might be more applicable to the Soviet delegation, for it is quite clear that the Soviet attitude towards our request for clarification of the Soviet proposal would influence the work of our Committee and would indicate whether the Soviet Union is really seeking serious negotiations. We still have hopes that the Soviet delegation will be prepared to provide us in due course with the necessary information about the Soviet proposal. Perhaps discussions between the two co-Chairmen will provide an occasion to enable us to move forward in our work.

To come to my second point: the Soviet representative devoted a major portion of his statement at our 132nd meeting to the problem of control. It is that portion of his statement upon which my delegation would like in particular to comment today. In all frankness we must say that the Soviet representative's remarks on the problem of control were disappointing, and, in fact, seemed to tend to close the door where we had hoped the Soviet Union had opened it, at least very slightly, earlier in our discussion. I refer to the statement by the Soviet representative (ibid., p. 7) that the willingness of the Soviet Union to accept inspection of the missiles and the associated launching pads to be allowed to certain States under the Gromyko proposal should not be interpreted as a departure from the general Soviet position opposing verification of the agreed levels of armaments to be retained.

In elaborating that statement, and in attempting to justify the Soviet position, Mr. Tsarapkin made a number of what appeared to be contradictory statements. He said, for example, that the fundamental Soviet position on the question of control is that --

"the scope of the control measures must correspond strictly to the scope and nature of the disarmament measures..." (ibid)

We believe that to be an excellent statement as far as it goes; but the Soviet Union seems to be unwilling to implement the idea underlying that basic concept, for in proposing a very far-reaching measure, from the standpoint of both its scope and its impact on the military environment, the Soviet Union refuses to accept the commensurate measures of verification.

(Mr. Stolle, United States)

In specific terms, all the Soviet Union has said is that it would be willing to accept verification of the number of the missiles and launching pads allowed to it under the Gromyko proposal, but without any provision whatsoever for providing assurance that no missiles or launching pads had been retained over and above that amount or were being produced clandestinely.

In other words, the Soviet Union appears willing to provide us with assurance that it will remain armed with a certain number of some missiles, but would be unwilling to give us adequate assurance that it really had disarmed to that level and was not producing more such armaments clandestinely. Yet the basic point here, surely, is to make certain that the parties have not retained and are not producing any armaments in excess of the agreed levels, rather than to ensure that they are actually maintaining those declared levels and not any lower levels.

The third point made by the Soviet representative also deals with the United Kingdom and United States criticisms that there are grave inadequacies in the Soviet proposal for verification measures in connexion with Foreign Minister Gromyko's proposal. In referring to my delegation's statements on 3 April (ENDC/PV.117, pp. 24-26) and 24 April (ENDC/PV.124, p.35), in which we pointed out the inadequacy of the Soviet position on verification as it specifically applies to the Gromyko proposal, the Soviet representative asserted again (ENDC/PV.132, p. 9) that such statements revealed a demand to establish control over all existing armaments from the very first stage. He claimed again that such a demand meant control without disarmament, a control which he claimed was in effect not different from what he commonly calls "espionage" or "reconnaissance."

There are two points in that statement which are somewhat puzzling. The Soviet representative said that our comments that the Gromyko proposal, as we understand it, would require much broader verification measures than those proposed by the Soviet Union would mean the establishment of control without disarmament. Now so far we have been led by the Soviet delegation to believe that the Gromyko proposal was indeed meant to be a very far-reaching measure; indeed, it has been claimed by the Soviet delegation that it would eliminate the threat of nuclear war. Consequently we assumed that the Gromyko proposal actually involved a major amount of disarmament -- although we are still in the dark about just how much -- and therefore would require broad measures of control.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

Another point which has perplexed us is the Soviet representative's reference to "reconnaissance" or "espionage". In his statement Mr. Tsarapkin asserted at some length that the objective of the West in seeking adequate verification of agreed levels was to obtain information about the location of Soviet nuclear installations which, in the Soviet representative's words, would allegedly enable the United States to launch an aggression. But all this time the Soviet delegation has been attempting to persuade us that the Gromyko proposal, if implemented, would by its very nature eliminate all possibility of nuclear war because no State could any longer undertake an aggression. Thus, under Soviet claims, targeting data would lose all significance. But, more than that, in contrast to these allegations about the collection of espionage information while verifying that there are no clandestine missiles above agreed retained levels, the Soviet Union has now apparently expressed willingness to allow us access to the data which it otherwise designates as the most sensitive of all -- namely, information about the deployment of, and apparently about many of the details of, the delivery vehicles to be retained under the Soviet proposal. This follows from the Soviet proposal (ENDC/PV.114, p.40) that the missiles and the launching pads thus retained be subject to inspection.

Now this seems to mean, in logic, that if the Gromyko proposal were carried out in good faith, no targeting information could be obtained beyond the information already available under the Soviet verification proposal, because no additional unrevealed, uninspected nuclear weapons delivery means or installations would have been concealed and would be subject to discovery. Thus the most sensitive weapons and installations would, under the Soviet proposal, be fully inspected on both sides and, according to Soviet claims there would be no possibility of nuclear aggression by the terms of the Soviet Union's own proposal. If we follow this reasoning, what would be the danger then if the whole country were to be opened to inspection to ensure against clandestine missile sites? Here again, submit, there is inconsistency in the Soviet delegation's argumentation.

The Soviet representative has also told us that under the Soviet proposal no armaments could be retained or produced clandestinely because the Soviet plan provides for extensive verification of the destruction of armaments to be reduced, and of armaments production facilities. But the Soviet Union fails to state that the Soviet proposal provides for such verification only at declared places of destruction and at declared production facilities, and that under the Soviet proposal, except after the end of stage I.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

the inspectors would not have the freedom of movement necessary to obtain assurance that no armaments or production facilities had been illegally concealed in the rest of the territory, which would amount, of course, to the great bulk of a country's area.

Now my delegation wishes to make clear that under the United States proposal (ENDC/30) there is no demand that the entire territory of a country be opened to inspection in the very first stage of disarmament. Indeed, the United States draft outline treaty was designed in such a way as to provide for gradual and progressive expansion of both the disarmament measures and the commensurate verification measures. We have given many reasons which explain our view on why it would be impractical, unreasonable and, indeed, tension-producing to insist on the inclusion of overly-radical measures in stage I. In addition to all these, however, there is this specific problem of verification which becomes all the more acute in view of the well-known Soviet sensitivity about allowing extensive control. We have stated on a number of occasions that, in any event, if we were ever to have radical disarmament measures early in the disarmament process, similarly radical measures of verification would be required.

Finally, in his statement on 15 May (ENDC/PV.132, pp. 5 et seq.) the Soviet representative confused two different things. He seemed to mix up what the United States delegation had said would be required by way of verification if the Gromyko proposal were accepted and implemented, on the one hand, and our verification requirements under the United States proposals for a 30 per cent across-the-board reduction of major arms in stage I, on the other hand. Naturally, our disarmament plan would make possible a reasonable approach to progressively-expanding inspection arrangements. We believe that the Gromyko plan would not.

In that connexion we should also like to point out another statement by the Soviet representative which in our view indicates that the Soviet Union either has not really thought through the problem at hand or is perhaps even attempting to confuse the issue. We refer to the assertion by the Soviet representative that the West applies different yardsticks to Soviet and United States proposals from the standpoint of verification, and that it is much more demanding with respect to Soviet proposals. As I have mentioned this morning, the Soviet representative himself has said that verification measures should correspond to the scope and nature of disarmament measures undertaken. He has also said that the Gromyko proposal is quite different from the Western stage I proposals. In fact, he has said that any comparison between the results of the Soviet approach in the Gromyko

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

proposal and those of the Western approach by a 30 per cent reduction in stage I would make clear such immense difference on the number of delivery vehicles to be retained as not to require any immediate specification of figures for the Soviet plan.

It is quite clear that, if the measures proposed are so different, the verification requirements will logically have to be just as different. And in that case the Soviet representative should have no real grounds for complaint about differences in the scope of inspection necessary under each plan's first stage, because, we submit, the United States delegation is applying the same principle consistently in each case: that the scope of inspection should be commensurate with the degree of disarmament.

One of the main themes of Soviet criticism of the United States position on verification, again as I have said this morning, has been that the verification of agreed levels to be retained as suggested by the United States has as one of its main objectives the gathering of intelligence information for aggressive purposes. But at the same time the Soviet representative, in his statement on 15 May said that one could not simultaneously conduct two contradictory policies. He said a State could not disarm and prepare for a world war at the same time, and do it in deep secrecy. He asserted that the Western Powers, in stating their objections to the Gromyko proposal, were putting forth an unreal and imaginary situation.

Let us assume for a moment, and purely for the sake of argument, that the Soviet representative is correct and that one really could not pursue the objective of disarmament and the objective of war preparations at the same time. It would seem to us that that thesis would completely undercut the Soviet objections to the kind of adequate verification the West has been advocating. However, I should like to point out immediately that we do not fully share the Soviet contention that one could not engage in secret war preparations during the disarmament process, although naturally we expect and hope that all parties to an agreement would act in good faith. But actually the problem here is not completely one of secret preparations for the actual launching of an attack; it is rather that of making sure that no party to an agreement should be allowed to gain military, and consequently political, advantage during the disarmament process by not adhering fully to the terms of the agreement.

That is the core of the problem, since such an advantage might be crucial for the security of all other States during the disarmament process. In the disarmament process all other States would have reduced their important and vital means of defence to a low

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

level. That situation would permit a State which had kept armaments clandestinely to wield tremendous power. It is not necessarily a question of actual attack; political blackmail and pressure could be even more effectively practised. The old saying that in the country of the blind the one-eyed man is king certainly applies here. On the basis of many statements by Soviet leaders we are confident that, regardless of what its delegation here appears to say to the contrary, the Soviet Union is well aware of the importance for each side of avoiding any such situation of military, and hence political, imbalance during the implementation of disarmament.

On 24 April (ENDC/PV.124, pp.33-36) my delegation set forth the preliminary conclusions we have reached with regard to the Gromyko proposal on the basis of the admittedly insufficient information the Soviet delegation has made available to us. Our Romanian colleague cited some of these preliminary conclusions this morning (supra, p.10). My delegation also pointed out, in addition to the grave problems the Gromyko proposal raises with respect to verification, its various other important deficiencies and inequities. Among other things, we stated that the Soviet proposal would greatly overburden the initial stages of disarmament, for it seems to call for the achievement almost at the outset of the disarmament process of a situation which we believe can be arrived at only somewhere very close to the end of that process.

My delegation pointed out also that the Soviet proposal not only seems to involve a radical and sudden change in favour of the Soviet Union in the overall defence structure of the countries concerned, but also appears to be designed to change in favour of the Soviet Union the residual mix of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles by calling for the elimination of those means of delivery on which the West has come to rely more than the Soviet Union, and for the retention of those delivery means on which the Soviet Union appears to place primary reliance.

In addition, we referred to the fact that the Gromyko proposal is linked to other proposals in the Soviet plan, the unacceptability of which we have stated on many occasions, such as those for the dismantling in stage I of so-called foreign military bases and for the withdrawal of so-called alien troops from foreign territory.

None of the statements we have heard from the Soviet representative or his allies since we put forward our preliminary conclusions on the Gromyko proposal has helped us to change our views. Indeed, some of the Soviet representative's remarks have tended to

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

reinforce them. However, we hope that, now we are about to move in our plenary discussion to the next item on our agenda, the Soviet delegation will study once again the problem of reduction of armaments in the first stage, that it will take into account the statements on the subject that have been made so far by various delegations, and that it will demonstrate a willingness to join with us in negotiating measures that would not jeopardize the security of any State, would be practical and feasible in stage I of the disarmament process, and would be accompanied by the necessary type and amount of verification.

Mr. CHRISTOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I propose making some very brief remarks which are, in our view relevant to the present situation and atmosphere as regards the disarmament problem and which should show, on the one hand, the exigencies they involve and, on the other, the hindrances to our work.

The discussion in which we are engaged has shown once more -- if that were necessary -- that the problem of eliminating the dangers of a nuclear war is still more than ever the key problem of disarmament. The existence of nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them to any point on the earth has created an extremely dangerous situation. The Western Powers' policy of perfecting, stockpiling and disseminating nuclear weapons, especially as lately manifested in the establishment of multilateral and other forces, is raising tension to a point never before reached. That is the actual position. It is creating throughout the world a feeling of anguish of which no one can be unaware, and all see plainly how alive the peoples of the world are to the danger.

The veritable wave of demonstrations of all kinds all over the world is a measure of the strength of this feeling, of how deep it goes into men's souls and minds. It is a revolt against measures that spell nuclear catastrophes for mankind, a categorical refusal to bow to what some are trying to suggest is inevitable. It is at the same time a useful reaction and one of the great hopes of salvation for mankind. Varying with the circumstances and from country to country, these movements against atomic war and death may take different forms but always have the same object: the elimination of the nuclear danger, peace through disarmament. It would be unfair to say that these movements are inspired by alarmist and irrational feelings. On the contrary, they reflect the very reality of the danger, of the gravity of the period through which we are passing.

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

To show the degree of intensity with which the danger is felt, to show how it penetrates the hearts and minds of men, I shall quote a passage from the appeal signed only a few days ago by a group of French writers. It runs:

"The writers signatories of this text make no claim to the gift of clairvoyance. Under the threat of a thermonuclear war, they simply face the facts and share the common anguish. An atomic conflict would be immeasurably greater than anything we know from history and experience of human misery ... So disarmament today becomes much more than one among many possible means of achieving peace. The existence of weapons of total destruction makes disarmament the sine qua non for man's survival."

These words express most clearly for us world public opinion on the present situation and the nuclear danger. It has already been said that our Committee cannot work in a vacuum, without taking account of what is happening outside, of the situation as it now is. My own delegation believes that it is necessary, and even that it is the duty of our Committee, to bear in mind the opinions of people who modestly say that they claim no gift of clairvoyance but simply face the facts and share the common anguish. What they want is precisely what it is our task to achieve -- general and complete disarmament.

In this Committee, as in all other international bodies, the socialist countries have directed their efforts towards a single goal: to seek out by all possible means a solution to disarmament problems, and in the first place to that of the elimination of the nuclear danger. On 21 September 1962, the Soviet Union put before the United Nations a proposal whose purpose, tenor and terms were fully explained during discussion in the Committee. It is a compromise proposal making concessions to the demands of the Western Powers regarding nuclear disarmament. Its aim is to eliminate the danger of a nuclear war as rapidly as possible.

Several meetings have been devoted to this proposal, at which the Western representatives have made more than forty statements. Apart from questions and requests for so-called "clarifications", what has been the contribution of the Western countries to the discussion of the problem on this new level to which the Soviet proposal, in an obvious attempt to break the deadlock, has raised it? Have we seen any new approach by the West reflecting the Soviet approach? What has been the Western contribution -- I mean, positive contribution?

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

To all such questions there is but one reply: Nothing.. The delegations of the Western Powers have not even tried to make a constructive contribution, to find a positive approach, to make any contribution whatever, although the Gromyko proposal -- as I have already had occasion to state -- was made to meet their demands. They have remained entrenched in their well-known positions. Their efforts have not been directed towards a constructive discussion, but have tended rather to minimize the Soviet proposal, and to confuse its real content by contradictory, muddled and negative attitudes.

During this discussion, protracted as it may have been, we have heard neither a concrete proposal nor even a single idea or suggestion that might give an inkling of the Western Powers' approach to the elimination of the threat and danger of a nuclear war. That is not fortuitous. The situation as it appears after what we have heard from the Western representatives may be summed up as follows.

On the one hand there is goodwill, a draft treaty and a Soviet proposal aimed at finding the quickest possible way of ridding the world of the danger of a nuclear war. That is the policy of elimination of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon delivery vehicles: it is the policy of disarmament.

On the other hand, there is the position of the United States and its allies, deliberately based on the retention and preservation of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, camouflaged by the so-called percentage reduction. We have already said what this really means. This is, whatever may be said to the contrary, a policy of retaining and using the threat of nuclear war. It is not, and cannot be, a policy with disarmament as its goal. The logical aim of this policy is to preserve the nuclear arsenals, the arms race, the stockpiling and dissemination of these weapons and the various theories on the balance of forces.

I would venture to add a comment on one of the paragraphs of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of 20 September 1961 which the Western delegations tend, we think to disregard. The fourth preambular paragraph of that Joint Statement reads:

"Affirming that to facilitate the attainment of general and complete disarmament ... it is important that all States abide by existing international agreements, refrain from any actions which might aggravate international tensions, and that they seek settlement of all disputes by peaceful means." (ENDC/5)

(Mr. Christov, Bulgaria)

Can it be said that the Atlantic Treaty Powers are refraining from any actions which might aggravate international tensions or that they are doing anything, however little, to facilitate the attainment of general and complete disarmament? The opposite is the case. And, despite all the Western delegations' efforts to convince the world that measures and plans for the establishment of "multilateral nuclear forces" should arouse no concern and that these measures come under the heading of normal activities, the facts are there to prove the contrary, showing as they do that these activities are aggravating international tensions, and in a way that might prove detrimental to the cause of disarmament and peace.

The same kind of trend is seen in the statements of the Western delegations repeating that the arms race is natural and even necessary for peace and security, and that, things being as they are, there is no need to worry, that certain measures are but a mere modernization of weapons, a development of Western defences, and so forth.

These are the arguments used to seek to justify the policy of the fait accompli. But that policy has nothing to do with disarmament; it only makes our Committee's task and the solution of the disarmament problem more and more difficult. All these faits accomplis, which are put to us as measures that are essential because there is still no agreement on disarmament, will be put to us later as "defensive nuclear arrangements of NATO", as "an inevitable reality", as an unchangeable "status quo" meeting the strategic and geographical needs of the West, and so on.

Hence any disarmament measure which in one way or another affects these "arrangements" will be rejected as unacceptable because it would be likely to destroy them, would tend to "demolish" them, would create "imbalance" and so on.

Those are the brief remarks which I wished to make.

Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): Because of the special character of Monday's meeting, there is a certain dislocation in the timing of this statement of mine in relation to our established plan of work. However, I think that according to the rules I am still in order in making a few remarks today on the question of nuclear testing.

It is useless to try to conceal the feelings of disappointment which beset us when we find the weeks going by without being able to register any results in our negotiations. This whole session of the Conference since we reconvened in February can be characterized as best as a period of waiting. That waiting was hopeful at the beginning, when the

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

remarkable progress made during the private great-Power negotiations in December and January made us believe that a treaty banning all nuclear tests was on its way -- or at least an "agreement to agree" on the part of the major nuclear Powers. As time passed our waiting, and that of the world at large, grew more impatient. At this late moment the waiting is becoming next to desperate. I know, Mr. Chairman, that you and all our colleagues share our anxiety at the fact that time is running critically short.

Of course we are aware that certain feelers exist between the nuclear Powers directly concerned. Therefore our attitude of waiting must continue. But uncertainty persists; and in the meantime the very factor of time takes on a more and more pressing importance. This moment should be judged propitious for the concluding of a test ban agreement. In any case today is more propitious than tomorrow. Just now there seems to exist a certain lull in testing activities, and this very fact must be taken advantage of. Perhaps I may be allowed to restate it even more bluntly: the time is now or perhaps never, because any atomic explosion this summer or autumn may turn nuclear weapon testing into an irrevocably persistent pattern for the foreseeable future.

We -- and I speak of course in the first person plural for the Swedish delegation, but I believe we are expressing also the attitude of all non-nuclear peoples -- must be forgiven for failing to comprehend what insurmountable obstacles stand in the way of such an agreement to stop further testing. We have listened to ample testimony from the leaders and spokesmen of the great nations that they are of one mind in their understanding of how their interests converge in this matter. The sincerity of their will to reach an agreement was eloquently evidenced in the letters exchanged between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev last winter. I should like to remind the Committee of a few of their statements.

Chairman Khrushchev wrote on 19 December 1962:

"It seems to me, Mr. President, that the time has now come to put a stop to nuclear tests once and for all ... This is a very propitious moment for doing so. ... We are now free to consider seriously other urgent international matters, in particular a subject which has long been ripe for action -- the cessation of nuclear tests. ...

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

"We believe that the path to agreement is now clear and plain. From 1 January of this new year of 1963, the world can be rid of the thunder of nuclear explosions." (ENDC/73, pp.2, 5)

President Kennedy replied on 28 December, among other things:

"There appear to be no differences between your views and mine regarding the need for eliminating war in this nuclear age. Perhaps only those who have the responsibility for controlling these weapons fully realize the awful devastation their use would bring.

"Having these considerations in mind and with respect to the issue of a test ban, I therefore sincerely hope that the suggestions that you have made in your letter will prove to be helpful in starting us down the road to an agreement." (ENDC/74, p.1)

No wonder that brought expectations around the world to a high pitch.

Now I would beg to be allowed respectfully to ask our two co-Chairmen to enlighten us on this score. What, in reality, is hindering a test ban agreement? Representatives of the two sides may themselves be convinced that some major issue stands between them; but they have so far failed to convince us, their colleagues at this Conference, that such is the case. Naturally, they have also failed to convince each other of the validity of their respective theses. And, most important, they have not been able to convince the world at large that there is any real divergence of interest or any serious technical difficulty involved.

Must we surmise that there is just a lack of political will to turn the tide and give the world this reassurance that tensions are to be relaxed? How else is the stalemate to be explained? It cannot be for the reason that other political issues are allowed to cloud the meeting of minds, for of such problems there will always be a plethora. And it cannot be for any technical lack of ideas on how the remaining narrow gap in positions on the test ban issue is to be bridged.

The non-aligned nations at this Conference have felt -- as I think most of them have also stated explicitly -- that the difference between the postures of the two sides is now so insignificant that an agreement could be based on any of them. However, if a solution cannot be reached by compromise initiatives from either side, then the nuclear Powers might take advantage of the ideas suggested by the non-aligned delegations. By means of

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

statements made at the beginning of the present session of the Conference we have sought diligently to present what are in reality the constituent elements of a compromise solution, even if not presented in any joint, authoritatively-signed proposal. The suggestions made by ourselves and our colleagues from February onwards have, however, not been given any attention in our continued deliberations.

However, through the statements by the non-aligned nations, a model does lie prepared if the great Powers wish to combine the various suggestions made by different non-aligned nations at the Conference.

I do not venture to suggest that such a model would be the solution taking us out of the present impasse. But if the nuclear Powers were interested in moving forward, in a needy case like this, with the aid of a tertium datur, if they combined the five or more elements which are available in the records of this Conference, they would have a compromise model to discuss. It would, of course, not surpass their ability to improve on this model as they might deem fit.

There is no need to reiterate the catalogue of risks involved in leaving open and unsettled the situation on nuclear testing. The risks connected with a test ban must be so incomparably smaller than the risks involved in not having one, according to a consensus of all responsible views. The danger of the spread of nuclear weapons to the fifth country has been invoked on innumerable occasions, but as time lapses more and more countries are nearing the twilight zone. Perhaps the issue has never been stated in more importunate terms than by President Kennedy at his press conference of 22 March, as directed as an argumentum ad hominem:

"If we do not soon succeed in achieving a test ban, ... by 1970, there may be ten nuclear Powers instead of four, and by 1975, fifteen or twenty ...

I see the possibility in the 1970's of the President of the United States having to face a world in which fifteen or twenty or twenty-five nations have these weapons. I regard that as the greatest possible danger."

And no other leader of a nuclear nation would find that prospect for his successors any more reassuring.

In this context it may perhaps also not be altogether out of place to remind ourselves of the harm which this delay is causing our Conference. Without a successful conclusion of the test ban issue as a first step, what other measures for disarmament can realistically be expected?

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

The effect of the present impasse undoubtedly is to diminish the confidence which we and mankind at large have entertained that effective negotiations for gradual disarmament were going to ensue from this Conference. For how long can this hope be maintained? I must admit that in this respect I share the apprehensions which have sometimes been voiced around this table that in the absence of concrete achievements speech-making is a risky art of self-defence. The repetition of arguments and of more or less propaganda-loaded statements becomes counter-productive. At least, every inclination to propaganda, every trace of retorts and rebuttals which has begun, giving such an imprint of the verbal interchange between the great Powers during this strange interlude, is -- excuse me for being frank enough to mention it -- wasted on members around this table. So it is becoming quite imperative that we find ways to make this Conference truly constructive again.

If it cannot be done immediately, because the political situation for the moment may be too delicate, when high-level contacts are being sought elsewhere, then probably a period of silence is to be preferred. That silence, which so many of us have observed at this stage of the nuclear test ban negotiations, is not to be construed as motivated by lack of interest, lack of ideas or lack of purpose; it is rather like holding your breath when watching somebody tackle a decisive hurdle. We have been passive in order not to upset the delicate poise before the final effort.

This amounts to saying that, despite all, we do expect that an agreement on this first issue on the agenda of our Disarmament Conference will soon see the light of day; and, with even greater emphasis, I want to assure you that we do expect that we have anyway heard the last of "the roar of nuclear tests", condemned as they were in the United Nations just about six months ago by a majority of the world's nations.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

At our meeting last Wednesday, 15 May, the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, touched (ENDC/PV.132, p. 20) upon a general topic which, as he expressed it, has a very important relation to our proceedings here.

In discussing this general topic, Mr. Burns quoted from a statement made by the Soviet representative, and also quoted the United States representative from a quotation given by the Soviet representative. These quotations made the representative of Canada

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

think of some passages in a book he had read called An Alternative to War or Surrender, written by Charles E. Osgood, professor of psychology at the University of Illinois; and Mr. Burns quoted these passages.

From all these quotations it became clear what Mr. Burns was trying to prove. He wanted to convince us that the Soviet proposals on general and complete disarmament and the United States proposals on this subject are in fact very similar. But the point is that in the negotiations the Soviet Union and the United States, as Mr. Burns put it, approach the same critical concepts in different ways -- that is, from different points of view.

Of course we can agree with this when it comes to such concepts as democracy or a free world. The socialist States have their own philosophical idea, their own criteria regarding democracy and freedom, just as the Western capitalist world has its own. Each of these world systems, socialist on the one hand and capitalist on the other, arranges its internal affairs in accordance with its own philosophical views and its own ideology. Recent events in Birmingham, Alabama, in the United States, and in South Africa provide eloquent confirmation of this. But of course these are their own internal affairs.

The problem of disarmament, however, is an entirely different matter. All the people of the world are interested in the solution of this problem because upon this depends the security of the peoples, the security of States. As everyone realizes, complete security will ensue only with the implementation of general and complete disarmament -- that is, when all armed forces, all military institutions and military training establishments in all States are disbanded, when nuclear weapons and all means of delivering them are prohibited and destroyed, when the production of armaments has ceased everywhere, and so forth; in short, when the programme of general and complete disarmament provided in the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2/Rev.1) has been implemented.

Of course, this immense primary task cannot be accomplished, so to speak, all at once at one go; but we must not delay its accomplishment. That is why the Soviet draft treaty lays down a five-year period for the completion of the programme of general and complete disarmament in three consecutive stages. The main advantage of the Soviet draft treaty is that in the very first stage of disarmament it provides for measures the implementation of which would lead to a very substantial reduction of the threat of a nuclear missile war, which is unquestionably the main concern of all mankind and must be considered as the first priority task by all governments, and in the first place by the governments of the great nuclear Powers.

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There is a direct relationship between disarmament measures and the security of States. The more extensive and substantial the disarmament measures, the further removed will be the threat of war, the more solid will the security of States and peoples become. And inversely, the less significant the proposed disarmament measures, the greater will be the danger of war, military attack and military conflict, and consequently the less will be the security of States and peoples.

In this matter there cannot be two philosophies, two points of view, two approaches. That is why Professor Osgood is wrong when he says that the proposals of the Soviet Union and the United States on the question of disarmament are similar, and that the only thing in which we differ from the United States is that we approach the evaluation of the same critical concepts in a different way. That is why Mr. Burns is wrong when he referred in this connexion to Professor Osgood as expressing his, Mr. Burns', views on this subject. The divergence here, as we have just shown, is much more serious and more profound and cannot be reduced merely to differences of interpretation, because these differences lead to frustrating the solution of the problem of disarmament.

In defending the position of the Western Powers in favour of maintaining the present situation with regard to armaments, Mr. Burns told us that the fears which led to the establishment of NATO still exist and that, while they do, the Western Powers will not agree to any measures which might affect the present military power of the NATO bloc or weaken its efforts to build up its military potential. But men of good will all over the world have their own opinion about what prompted the Western Powers to establish NATO. The whole world knows that what led the Western Powers to establish the aggressive NATO bloc was the course, taken by them at the end of the second world war, of the cold war policy, the policy "from a position of strength", the main provisions of which were formulated by Winston Churchill in his Fulton speech, at which, very significantly, the then President of the United States was present.

This openly-aggressive course of the foreign policy of the Western Powers was devised and worked out in the fumes of intoxication from the United States' atomic monopoly. The first harbinger of this policy could be seen in the ominous glow of the nuclear explosions over the defenceless Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the last weeks of the war. This, of course, was senseless cruelty which could not even be justified from the standpoint of military necessity, because there was no longer any such necessity at the

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time. According to the intention of the authors of this policy, the cold-war period was to be a period of feverish military preparations, an intensive armaments race, and the build-up of a colossal military potential by the Western Powers.

That is why Mr. Burns' statement on 15 May (ENDC/PV.132, p.24) that the reasons which led to the establishment of NATO still exist, and that while they do it cannot be expected that the Western Powers will change their present policy clearly shows that the Western Powers, instead of disarmament, prefer to continue the policy of building up their armaments and developing their military potential, and instead of peaceful co-existence prefer the policy "from a position of strength" and preparations for war. Mr. Burns has told us that the fears which led to the establishment of NATO still exist. What fears is he referring to? The existence in the world of unsettled political problems and, as a consequence, the growth of the danger of war? But if Mr. Burns means the existence of fears of this kind, then at the same time he must understand perfectly well that these fears can be eliminated quite simply and easily.

For this it is necessary resolutely, seriously and sincerely to set about disarmament. And the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament opens up wide possibilities for this. Under this draft treaty, by the end of the first stage of disarmament all means of delivery of nuclear weapons would be eliminated except for a small and agreed number of missiles to be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States until the end of the second stage of disarmament. All foreign military bases would be liquidated and the troops withdrawn to within the boundaries of their own national territories. The armed forces both of the USSR and the United States would be reduced to 1,900,000 men. In keeping with these disarmament measures, control and verification measures would be carried out. The implementation of these disarmament measures in stage I would radically reduce the danger of a nuclear missile war, and consequently would increase the security of States and peoples.

Of course at the present time, when there is no agreement on disarmament, when the arms race is being more and more intensified every day and military preparations have reached unprecedented and monstrous proportions, it is quite understandable that there exist fears connected with the increasing threat of a nuclear missile war. But everything will begin to change as soon as we set about the implementation of the real disarmament measures provided for in the Soviet draft treaty. It is by following this path that the threat of war will be eliminated.

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As for the unsettled political problems, they must find their solution by peaceful means, by way of negotiation. Any attempt by the Western Powers to justify their military preparations and their refusal to accept real disarmament measures by referring to the existence of unsettled problems in the world is groundless, not to mention the fact that such a policy is diametrically contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

The Canadian representative, like the other representatives of the Western Powers, behaves in a strange way. On the one hand he delivers lectures to us saying that --

"History teaches us... that nations cannot rely solely on fair words promising peace and friendship uttered by any nations that has military power to enforce its policies." (ibid., p.24)

This sentence of Mr. Burns should obviously be understood to mean that such fair words as the promise of peace and friendship must be combined with disarmament obligations in order to eliminate such a factor as the predominant military power of any country which might be used by the possessor of such power to enforce its policies.

All this is very well; but when we propose effective disarmament measures the West obstructs them; its representatives tell us that these measures are too radical, too far-reaching, and that they would lead to upsetting or even removing the existing military superiority or advantage, which, we are given to understand, would deprive the country possessing such superiority of the possibility of exerting pressure on the weak. Never before have we heard such an outspoken vindication of war as that which came from the lips of General Burns when on 15 May he said:

"We have learnt the means of waging thermonuclear war, and unless we contemplate as a first stage measure of disarmament the elimination of all scientists and technicians capable of re-establishing the art of nuclear war, the danger of escalation will always exist." (ibid.)

We venture to disagree with the opinion of the Western Powers in this regard.

Just think for a moment what these words of Mr. Burns mean. They mean nothing less than the complete rejection of the principle of peaceful co-existence. These words of one of the leading spokesmen of the Western Powers in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament confirm in the most eloquent way that the Western Powers are relying and

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setting their hopes on war and are preaching its fatal inevitability. The Western Powers obviously want to make people get accustomed to the idea that war is an inevitable evil and that it is necessary to accept it and give up the struggle for peace and disarmament. On the other hand, this statement by a representative of the Western Powers gives, so to say, a jolt to our minds in the sense that it is an authoritative admission by one of the official representatives of the Western bloc that the ruling circles of States with a capitalist system cannot imagine a world without war and that they reject such a world.

But in that case the task of finding an alternative and of finding a way to a world without weapons and without war faces the peoples in all its magnitude. There is such a way for mankind, Mr. Burns. But in order to arrive at this goal -- that is, a world without weapons and without war -- it is not at all necessary to turn the clock back eighteen years. The peoples have already awakened. They will not passively accept the present situation in which mankind is under the constant threat of a nuclear missile war. The peoples all over the world reject, categorically and with ever-increasing force, the political policy defended here by the representatives of the Western Powers, according to which the danger of war will always exist. It cannot be doubted that the peoples of the world will find ways and means to establish in the world such systems, such a regime as will ensure the peaceful progress of mankind and banish for ever the threat of war.

Among all the arguments put forward by the representative of Canada on 15 May, there is only one with which we can agree. I am referring to the following words:

"... the defensive measures taken are governed by the threats which they are intended to counter." (ibid., p. 22)

This is a correct statement and we have no objection to it. But immediately after this unquestionably correct statement Mr. Burns poured out, as from a horn of plenty, arguments of a highly dubious character. First of all he said that, for the Western Powers to accept the Soviet disarmament plan,

"We must be shown that that plan will not break up the co-ordinated defensive dispositions which together form the safeguard against what we believe to be the threat confronting us." (ibid.)

How, then, do you, the representatives of the Western Powers, visualize the whole matter of disarmament? What is the situation? We propose that in the very first stage of disarmament the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States should be reduced

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to 1,900,000 men. This measure alone, when implemented, would entail definite changes "in the co-ordinated defensive dispositions", to use Mr. Burns' expression, of both the Soviet Union and the United States. Further, we propose that in the very first stage of disarmament all means of delivery of nuclear weapons should be destroyed except for a strictly limited, agreed number of missiles to be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States, that military bases on foreign territories should be eliminated, and that the troops stationed at these bases should be withdrawn to their own national territories.

There is no doubt that these measures would entail substantial changes in the co-ordinated defensive dispositions of both the Soviet Union and the United States. But to state that one is prepared to disarm, and at the same time to demand that in the process of disarmament co-ordinated defensive dispositions should be not disturbed, are two things that are hardly compatible. One cannot demand, for instance, that a swimmer should jump into the water without splashing it and getting wet. Consequently, if the Western Powers are seriously thinking of disarming, they must not put forward such contradictory and mutually-exclusive conditions as are incompatible with real disarmament.

Moreover, Mr. Burns, after the example of his NATO partners, resorts to the unwarranted assertion that the NATO military bloc would break up in the process of implementing the first stage of disarmament measures proposed in the Soviet draft treaty. And this, as Mr. Burns explained, is the main objection of the West to stage I of the Soviet disarmament plan. It seems to us that this argument of the representatives of the Western Powers, apart from its complete lack of foundation, is also characteristic in that it reveals its authors as people preparing for war and not for disarmament. Indeed, it is only by the concern to intensify preparations for war that we can explain the fact that the Western Powers place such emphasis on the inviolability and integral maintenance of the NATO military bloc in the process of disarmament.

The concern to maintain NATO as an instrument of war comes to the fore and pushes disarmament considerations into the background. Mr. Burns said in this regard on 15 May that the Western Powers object and will continue to object to the measures proposed by the Soviet Union for the first stage of disarmament --

"... even if, taking the statistics of manpower and armaments of the separate NATO nations and adding them together, the sum were approximately equal to the corresponding statistics for States members of the Warsaw Pact bloc." (ibid.)

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Further, Mr. Burns said (ibid.) that these disarmament measures would be unacceptable to the Western Powers even if they were implemented with the control and verification demanded by the West. On this point Mr. Burns showed commendable sincerity.

Now the core of the position of the Western Powers has finally been stripped of its verbal trimmings and has appeared before the Committee in its naked, so to say its natural uncovered guise. Up till now the Western Powers have been telling us that they cannot accept the Soviet disarmament proposals because they consider the control measures inadequate. Now they tell us that the Western Powers will not agree to the disarmament measures proposed by the Soviet Union even if they are accompanied by control measures which the Western Powers themselves consider adequate.

Up till now the representatives of the Western Powers have been telling us that the disarmament measures proposed by the Soviet Union are unacceptable to them because these measures, in their opinion, might give an advantage to the Soviet Union, since, as they have asserted, the Soviet Union has a numerical superiority in armed forces and in conventional armaments. Now they tell us that the Western Powers cannot agree to the disarmament measures proposed by the Soviet Union even if, as a result of implementing these measures, the armed forces and armaments of the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries taken together or separately are equal. Here, therefore, it is not at all a question of control or of the superiority of the Soviet Union in armed forces and armaments, but of the unwillingness of the Western Powers to disarm. The gist of the apprehensions about which Mr. Burns told us last time is the fear that disarmament measures might affect to some extent or from some angle the mechanism of war organized by the Western Powers. That is the point in reality.

At the meeting on 8 May Mr. Burns said (ENDC/PV.129, p.6) that there were three main points on which the West would like to have explanations and clarifications from the Soviet delegation in connexion with the Soviet proposals in the field of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

Mr. Burns' first question concerned the object which, in the view of the Soviet Union, implementation of the Soviet proposals of 21 September 1962 (A/PV.1127, provisional, p.38-40) would achieve. It seems to us that this object is perfectly clear: if not to eliminate completely, at least to reduce as much as possible the threat of a nuclear missile war which is hanging over mankind. Everyone understands this except the representatives of the

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Western Powers, who are obviously dissembling when they say that the object of this Soviet proposal is not clear. What the representative of India said on this score was brief and to the point. After listening to this question put by Mr. Burns, he said (ENDC/PV.129,p.17) that the first question does not arise.

Mr. Burns' second question (ibid., p.7) concerned the numbers and specific types of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles which should be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States until the end of the second stage. We have already repeatedly explained to the Western Powers the gist of our proposal on this matter. First we must say that, with regard to specific types of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, we have stated clearly that we mean intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the ground-to-air category. So this question does not arise either. As for the numbers of missiles to be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States, we have stated the fundamental criteria to be used as a guide in determining the specific numbers of missiles to be retained. These numbers must be strictly limited, minimal, and agreed between the Soviet Union and the United States. Thus on the second question as well the United States has completely adequate information on which to take a decision.

The third question (ibid., p.8) concerned the problem of verification. On this question we gave a reply which at first surprised the Western representatives and was received by them with obvious satisfaction. We said we agreed that control over the remaining missiles should be established directly at the launching pads (ENDC/PV.114, p.40). Everyone realizes that this is the most sensitive and effective form of verification. However, after a short while the appetites of the Western representatives began to grow catastrophically, and they began to demand control over all remaining armaments in general. In other words, they reverted to their demand for control over all remaining armaments.

This means that the Western Powers have gone back again to demands aimed at securing favourable conditions for the collection of intelligence information on the defence system and on individual defence installations of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has already repeatedly and categorically rejected these demands. We have already repeatedly objected to these unwarranted claims of the United States. Our objections still stand. In view of the feverish military preparations of the Western Powers, the Soviet Union cannot accept any so-called control over the remaining armaments -- that is, control without disarmament or, in other words, intelligence activities.

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Thus the United States and its Western allies have a clear idea of the object of the Soviet proposal. They have a clear idea of the types of missiles to be retained. They are also familiar with the fundamental criteria to be used as a guide in determining the agreed number of missiles to be retained. The United States and its Western allies have received from the Soviet Union what they have insistently been striving for -- control over the remaining missiles at their launching pads. Thus on all three questions put forward by the representative of Canada at the meeting of 8 May the Western Powers have received from us the information necessary for taking a decision on the matter, as well as the explanations and clarifications they requested.

The Western Powers should not disregard the demands of the peoples of the world to put an end to the threat of a nuclear missile war. The Soviet Union's proposal opens the way to this goal. We shall not give up the hope that the Western Powers will show their respect for these demands of the peoples, and will accept the Soviet Union's proposal for the destruction in the very first stage of disarmament of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons except for an agreed, strictly limited number of intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the ground-to-air category to be retained until the second stage only by the Soviet Union and the United States.

Mr. RAE (Canada): We have listened with great interest to the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union. He devoted a good deal of time and attention to important statements made by the head of the Canadian delegation recently in our Conference. He raised so many points that we should like to examine the verbatim record with great care and reply to his observations with the attention and perspective which will be required. However, I should like to make one or two brief comments now, since in my view a number of inferences have been drawn which go far beyond the burden and the content of the statements made by Mr. Burns, in particular the statement he made at our meeting on 15 May.

I regret that there has been either a misunderstanding or perhaps a misinterpretation of the statement which the head of the Canadian delegation made at that meeting. At one point the representative of the Soviet Union referred to an extract from a professor's book which Mr. Burns had quoted. Mr. Burns quoted the following from that book:

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"The proposals that have been presented by both the USSR and the United States for general and complete disarmament are actually quite similar." (ENDC/PV.132, p. 21)

That, of course, was not a statement made by Mr. Burns; it was a statement made by that particular professor. Mr. Burns then went on to say:

"And here I might interpolate that the Canadian delegation has pointed out before in this Committee the similarities in approach which have been effected through negotiations." (ibid.)

My delegation and, I believe, all the delegations here are fully conscious of the points of difference which exist in this most vital area; but we are also anxious to do what we can to seek to overcome them. I believe that my delegation, among others, has played a part in trying to move forward in the areas where we might achieve common ground.

I regret that statements of the kind we have heard from the previous speaker have been made, for the central point is that the purpose of the statement which Mr. Burns made was to set out as clearly and as objectively as possible the basic reasons why the Soviet Union's first-stage proposal, taken as a whole, posed grave difficulties for the Western alliance, and to ask the Soviet representative for an equally clear explanation of what security problems, if any, his Government considered would result from the implementation of the provisions of the United States proposal. We have heard once again that the United States plan does not, in the view of the Soviet and other socialist delegations, eliminate the threat of nuclear war in the first stage of the disarmament programme, and that thus it cannot provide a basis for negotiation. We have done our utmost to persuade the representatives of the socialist countries that to concentrate on this theme, as they have done, is not to help our negotiations forward.

We here are all agreed that the arms race is intolerable and that the measure of security which it affords can be at best only very precarious. We realize that the process of the implementation of a programme of general and complete disarmament will result in the eventual modification and disbandment of defensive military alliances once conditions are created which make such alliances unnecessary. But that is not the point at issue. What Mr. Burns has been arguing is that the implementation of the first-stage measures proposed by the Soviet Union would create a situation in which the Soviet Union and its allies would acquire unilateral military advantages over the members of the Western

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alliance; and I think that nothing that has been said this morning by the representative of the Soviet Union alters our viewpoint in that fundamental respect.

If the representative of the Soviet Union, instead of following the path he has taken, could have told us why, in his view, the United States proposals would not curb the arms race, or could have stated in what specific ways their implementation would not serve to increase the security of all States, including those in the Soviet group, we might have been able by this time to register some progress towards a constructive exchange of views. In reply to what has been said about the reception which the Western Powers have given to the proposal put forward by Foreign Minister Gromyko (A/PV.1127, provisional, p.38-40) the statement made by Mr. Burns is clear and on the record.

I would remind Mr. Tsarapkin, as the representative of Romania did earlier this morning, (supra, p. 8) that Canada was among the first to welcome this change in the Soviet position, since we hoped that the advancing of the Gromyko proposal would provide for a more constructive and realistic attitude on the part of the Soviet Union to the problems involved in the reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles. Although we have pointed out the unacceptable character of the Soviet first stage proposals, taken as a whole and as they now stand (ENDC/2/Rev.1) we have never rejected the Gromyko proposal, but rather have sought to elucidate and clarify its real meaning. We still hope to be able to do that, and as a delegation we regret that during the long debate that we have had on items 5(b) and 5(c) (ENDC/1/Add.3) the Soviet representative has not yet, in our view, provided the basic clarification of the present Soviet position on this matter without which it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the Western Powers to assess the merits and the implications of the amendment to the original Soviet proposal which was tabled by Foreign Minister Gromyko at the General Assembly last autumn.

Instead of answering what are in our view vital and reasonable questions about the Gromyko proposal, the representative of the Soviet Union has attacked the alleged aggressive intentions of the Western alliance, and as a result our debate on the reduction of armaments has not been as useful as it might otherwise have proved to be. However, we believe that this discussion has been profitable, at least in so far as it has served to focus the attention of the Committee on one of the most vital problems which, in our judgement, must be solved in the early stages of the disarmament programme.

(Mr. Rae, Canada)

For that reason we would support the suggestion, which was made by the representative of India on 15 May (ENDC/PV.132, p. 38), that the co-Chairmen undertake to draw up a paper clearly presenting the positions of the two sides on this issue and underlining the basic differences still preventing agreement. Such a paper would, in our view, serve a useful purpose in crystallizing in all our minds the issues which have emerged during this long debate in which we have been engaged.

I should like to add one final word. I think it will be obvious to everyone in this Chamber that the interest of the Government of Canada and of the Canadian delegation in disarmament is clear and needs no elaboration. We have participated in every disarmament conference since the end of the war; we have worked, and Mr. Burns has worked, steadily and with persistence towards the achievement of effective disarmament, and we shall go on working in that direction.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and thirty-fifth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Sir Paul Mason, representative of the United Kingdom.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Romania, Czechoslovakia, the United States of America, Bulgaria, Sweden, the Soviet Union and Canada.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 24 May 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m..

